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三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈合作利潤(rùn).doc

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三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈合作利潤(rùn),摘 要當(dāng)今市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下,企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已逐漸演化為供應(yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。同時(shí),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境的日益復(fù)雜以及企業(yè)可用資源的有限性等因素使得供應(yīng)鏈中的企業(yè)勢(shì)必要在創(chuàng)新方面開(kāi)展更加廣泛的協(xié)同,有效整合企業(yè)創(chuàng)新所需的各種資源和能力,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新。而要使供應(yīng)鏈成員從整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈合作最優(yōu)的角度決策,就必須對(duì)合作利潤(rùn)在各成員間進(jìn)行...
編號(hào):10-209824大小:2.51M
分類(lèi): 論文>管理學(xué)論文

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此文檔由會(huì)員 違規(guī)屏蔽12 發(fā)布

摘 要
當(dāng)今市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下,企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已逐漸演化為供應(yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。同時(shí),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境的日益復(fù)雜以及企業(yè)可用資源的有限性等因素使得供應(yīng)鏈中的企業(yè)勢(shì)必要在創(chuàng)新方面開(kāi)展更加廣泛的協(xié)同,有效整合企業(yè)創(chuàng)新所需的各種資源和能力,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新。而要使供應(yīng)鏈成員從整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈合作最優(yōu)的角度決策,就必須對(duì)合作利潤(rùn)在各成員間進(jìn)行合理分配,使成員各自利潤(rùn)都得到提高的同時(shí)又保證整個(gè)渠道總利潤(rùn)最大,這將對(duì)加深成員之間的合作關(guān)系、維持供應(yīng)鏈穩(wěn)定性具有重要的意義。
本文選取具有典型意義的三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈作為研究對(duì)象,在考慮三方成員同時(shí)創(chuàng)新的基礎(chǔ)上,運(yùn)用博弈論及相關(guān)方法,建立了三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈合作利潤(rùn)分配模型,包括集中決策情況下的模型、分散決策情況下的模型(兩種)、存在部分聯(lián)盟情況下的模型(兩種),并對(duì)這幾種模型的決策變量及各方利潤(rùn)作比較;對(duì)三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈合作利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行分配,在傳統(tǒng)的三方同時(shí)分配的基礎(chǔ)上提出了兩步分配法,并確定了產(chǎn)品的中間轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)格;通過(guò)利用收入共享契約進(jìn)行利潤(rùn)分配,討論了收入共享契約與因子分配法的區(qū)別與聯(lián)系;提出了構(gòu)建第三方機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行利潤(rùn)分配并探討了利用第三方機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行利潤(rùn)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制、團(tuán)體懲罰機(jī)制;研究了多次合作情況下的利潤(rùn)分配機(jī)制。
本文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新體現(xiàn)在:(1)模型建立方面:在分析供應(yīng)鏈成員交易過(guò)程的基礎(chǔ)上,還考慮了供應(yīng)鏈成員的創(chuàng)新情況,即銷(xiāo)售量的大小不僅取決于價(jià)格,還取決于成員的創(chuàng)新情況,即市場(chǎng)價(jià)格越低或成員創(chuàng)新能力越強(qiáng),銷(xiāo)售量越大;(2)利潤(rùn)分配方法方面:借鑒通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)中的兩種不同網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu):集中式結(jié)構(gòu)和分布式結(jié)構(gòu),提出了兩步分配法:先是供應(yīng)商與制造商和零售商組成的整體進(jìn)行分配,然后制造商再與零售商進(jìn)行二次分配。

關(guān)鍵詞 供應(yīng)鏈;合作;利潤(rùn)分配;Stackelberg博弈;分配方法;分配機(jī)制

Abstract
In today’s marketing economic environment, competition among enterprises has gradually become competitive between supply chain and supply chain. Meanwhile, competitive environment is increasingly complex and the resources available to the enterprise is limited, enterprises in the supply chain must collaborate more extensive in innovation in order to integrate all kinds of resources and capacity which is required by enterprise innovation and achieve collaborative innovation. If we want enterprises in supply chain decision-making from optimum angle of entire supply chain, it must distribute cooperation profits in a reasonable way among members, which makes all the members’ profits increased and the total channel profits is the largest at the same time, and it is very meaningful to deepen cooperation among members and to maintain stability in the supply chain.
A typical three-level supply chain is selected as a research object in this paper, a three-level supply chain profits distribution model is established through game theory and related methods in considering three members innovate simultaneously, including centralized decision, decentralized decision(two models) and part of alliance decision(Two models),and decision variables and members' profits of these models are compared; then cooperation profits of three-level supply chain is allocated, a two-step distribution method on the basis of the traditional distribution is proposed, and the transfer price of intermediate products is determined; next, distributing profits through revenue sharing contract is provided , the difference and connection between revenue sharing contract and the factor distribution method is discussed; at last, profits distribution mechanism of three-level supply chain based on third-party institution involvement is discussed, using third-party institution for working up profits compensation mechanism and group punishment mechanism is probed, and profits distribution mechanism for multiple cooperation are discussed.
The innovations of this dissertation are: (1)model-building: considering innovation in the supply chain members besides transaction procedure, that is the size of sales depends not only the sales price but also the innovation of members ,the lower the sales price is, the harder the members are, the size of sales is larger.(2)profits distribution methods: draw on two different communication networks network structure: centralized structure and the distributed structure, a two-step distribution method is proposed: firstly, supplier distribute profits with the entirety of manufacturer and retailer ,and then manufacturer distribute profits with retailer.

Keywords Three-level Supply Chain; Cooperation; Profit Allocation; Stackelberg Game; Allocation Methods; Allocation Mechanism
目 錄
摘 要 I
Abstract II
第1章 緒 論 1
1.1 研究背景、目的和意義 1
1.1.1 研究背景 1
1.1.2 研究目的和意義 1
1.2 國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀 2
1.2.1 供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)分配方法研究現(xiàn)狀 2
1.2.2 供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)分配機(jī)制研究現(xiàn)狀 4
1.3 研究思路、主要內(nèi)容及創(chuàng)新點(diǎn) 7
1.3.1 研究思路 7
1.3.2 主要研究?jī)?nèi)容 7
1.3.3 創(chuàng)新點(diǎn) 8
第2章 相關(guān)理論綜述 9
2.1 委托代理理論 9
2.2 博弈理論 9
2.3 利潤(rùn)轉(zhuǎn)移理論 10
2.4 供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)分配模型 12
2.5 供應(yīng)鏈核心企業(yè)與合作關(guān)系 14
2.5.1 主體企業(yè)與核心企業(yè) 14
2.5.2 核心企業(yè)的作用 16
2.5.3 渠道權(quán)力的對(duì)角線轉(zhuǎn)移 18
2.6 本章小結(jié) 21
第3章 供應(yīng)鏈合作利潤(rùn)分配機(jī)制 22
3.1 供應(yīng)鏈合作利潤(rùn)分配的內(nèi)涵 22-b..