理性政府下的貨幣危機及其傳染分析報告
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[摘 要] 本文在理性政府的假設(shè)下，討論了貨幣危機均衡的多重性與唯一性以及貨幣危機的傳染。在貨幣投機攻擊成本和收益固定的模型中，經(jīng)濟基本面處于危機區(qū)時，基本面的不確定性，并不能消除多重均衡。當貨幣投機攻擊的成本和收益都與經(jīng)濟基本面相關(guān)時，不管是靜態(tài)模型還是動態(tài)模型，貨幣危機的均衡都是唯一的。當其他國家的貨幣貶值時，本國維持固定匯率的收益和放棄固定匯率時的信譽損失下降，使本國政府傾向于放棄固定匯率。
[關(guān)鍵詞] 貨幣危機、投機攻擊、經(jīng)濟基本面、最優(yōu)停止、傳染

[Abstract] Under the assumption of rational government, the paper discusses the multiplicity and uniqueness of currency crises equilibrium and the contagion of currency crises. In the model with fixed cost and payoff of speculative attack, when the fundamental is in crisis zone, the uncertainty of fundamental cannot eliminate multiple equilibria. However, when the cost and payoff of speculative attack are relevant to the fundamental, the static model together with the dynamic model shows that the equilibrium of currency crises is unique. As the devaluation of other currency makes both domestic benefit of fixed exchange rate and reputation loss of devaluation decline, domestic government is inclined to abandon the fixed regime.
[Keywords] Currency crises, Speculative Attack, Economic Fundamental, Optimal Stopping, Contagion

目錄
一、 引言
二、固定投機攻擊成本模型
三、可變投機攻擊成本下的靜態(tài)模型
四、可變投機攻擊成本下的動態(tài)模型
五、危機的傳染
六、結(jié)束語
參考文獻
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