花落誰家：關(guān)于高考志愿填報制度的博弈模型學(xué)術(shù)論文
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[摘 要] 本文運用一個兩人博弈的簡單模型分析了現(xiàn)行高考制度中長期并存的三種志愿填報制度（考前報、估分報和知分報）的均衡結(jié)果，并志愿填報數(shù)目的影響進行了探討?；窘Y(jié)論是三種填報制度之間不存在絕對的效率差別，考前報、估分報，以及對志愿填報數(shù)的限制都有可能是有效率的。

[關(guān)鍵字] 博弈，高考制度，信息和激勵


Abstract: The paper explores the three co-existing Application mechanisms of College Entrance Examination, i.e. Applying before exam, after exam but before scores announcement, and after announcement. Under a 2-play game framework, it gives the Nash Equilibrium outcomes, with additional discussion on effects of application quotas. We found that there are no absolute efficiency differences among all the three, only with comparative advantages depending on some parameters. It also seems surprising that the application quotas may be efficient.

Keywords: Game, College Entrance Examination, Information and Incentive
一、 問題的提出
二、 模型
1、 情形2：只允許填報一個志愿
2、 小結(jié)
三、 含義
1、 政策含義
2、引申含義
四、 結(jié)論
附錄：關(guān)于高考志愿填報制度的一般性博弈模型的一個描述