Investor pricing of CEO equity incentives
Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman
Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the form of stock and options.The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk) for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.
Keywords：CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity capital
Introduction
總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)的投資者定價(jià)
Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman
摘 要
本論文的主要目的是探討首席執(zhí)行官以股票和期權(quán)形式的報(bào)酬問(wèn)題。首席執(zhí)行官報(bào)酬調(diào)整的目的是通過(guò)優(yōu)化調(diào)整首席執(zhí)行官作為股東的利益，使首席執(zhí)行官做出更多的投資決策（盡管有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）。然而，最近的研究表明，這些激勵(lì)措施有重大弊端（例如，他們鼓動(dòng)高管操縱對(duì)外公開(kāi)的業(yè)績(jī)，降低會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量）。鑒于積極的總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)效應(yīng)和不良的信息質(zhì)量效果之間的沖突，“CEO股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否增加公司價(jià)值”便成了一個(gè)開(kāi)放的實(shí)證問(wèn)題的。我們看看，在1992年至2007年間，總裁股權(quán)激勵(lì)是否在公司發(fā)生特定事前，其定價(jià)高于股票風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)。在這一時(shí)期，我們的分析控制在兩個(gè)潛在的結(jié)構(gòu)變化之中。首先是1995年美國(guó)特拉華州最高法院的裁決，它增加了在美國(guó)特拉華州注冊(cè)成立的公司在收購(gòu)方面的保護(hù)（降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）。第二個(gè)是2002年頒布的薩班斯-奧克斯利法案，它影響著企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的承擔(dān)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)和盈余管理?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō)，我們的研究結(jié)果表明，總裁的股