摘要 銀行家們都關(guān)注巴塞爾協(xié)議，尤其是新巴塞爾協(xié)議中關(guān)于風(fēng)險的控制，因為風(fēng)險是銀行的重要組成部分。這最基本問題是“當過多的風(fēng)險出現(xiàn)時，新巴塞爾協(xié)議是否可以有效地限制銀行承擔(dān)過多的風(fēng)險？“我通過概述過度風(fēng)險的定義和分析巴塞爾有效處理這種風(fēng)險的程度來回答這些問題。我覺得新巴塞爾協(xié)議的措施既費錢又有不充分的地方，可能會增加過度冒險。最后，我做出的一個更好方法——基于資本/資產(chǎn)比率的包括完全必要的資金和及時的糾正措施的次級債券。

關(guān)鍵詞 巴塞爾協(xié)議風(fēng)險，過度風(fēng)險，銀行破產(chǎn)，次級債務(wù)，迅速糾正行動

對巴塞爾協(xié)議和新巴塞爾協(xié)議而言，兩者都（切實地，著力地）關(guān)注于銀行的風(fēng)險承受能力。風(fēng)險是銀行的重要組成部分。銀行家作為提供貸款和其它投資的先驅(qū)者，因為它們可能蒙受損失既不是自己的群體也是不其股東和員工。然而，在一個特定的社會中，應(yīng)該考慮過度風(fēng)險的存在增加了銀行破產(chǎn)的危險。因此，我將通過討論著手這個分析，在“過度風(fēng)險的劃定”方面，包括有益的風(fēng)險、“過度”的風(fēng)險和3種可能被他們認為是過度的情況下的風(fēng)險。根據(jù)“新巴塞爾協(xié)議-基本協(xié)定”，我概述和分析了一些新巴塞爾協(xié)議對資本和風(fēng)險之間關(guān)系的基本協(xié)定。新巴塞爾協(xié)議的制定是為了



Abstract Both Basel I and Basel II are concerned (indeed, obsessed) with risk taking by bankers. But risk is an essential part of banking. The essential issues are “when are such risks excessive and does Basel II effectively constrain bankers from taking excessive risks?” I answer these questions by outlining alternative definitions of excessive risk and analyzing the extent to which Basel II deals effectively with this risk. I find the Basel II measures both costly and inadequate, and likely increase excessive risk taking. I conclude with a preferable alternative procedure – including subordinated debt fully in required capital and prompt corrective action based on prestructured capital/asset ratios.

Keywords Basel II Risk. Excessive risk. Bank failure. Subordinated debt. Prompt corrective action

Both Basel I and Basel II are concerned (indeed, obsessed) with risk taking by bankers. But riskis an essential part of banking. Bankers who forebear from making loans and other investments because they might incur losses serve neither their communities nor their shareholders and employees. However, risks that increase a bank’s danger of insolvency might be considered excessive in a particular society. Hence, I begin this analysis by distinguishing, in “Delineation of Excessive Risk”, between risks that are beneficial and those that are “excessive” and three circumstances in which they might be considered to be excessive. In the following “Basel II – Basic Assumptions”, I outline and analyze some basic assumptions of Basel II about the relationship between capital and risk. Basel II was developed to deal with the shortcomings of Basel I. However, as shown in this section, some important shortcomings are ignored and, hence, continued, by Basel II. The morｅ　complex risk measures that Basel II offers as improvements over the crude measures employed by Basel I are outlined in “Basel II and Risk Measurement”. As I show in “There isa Better Way”, these Basel II measures are both costly and inadequate. Furthermore, as discussed in “Basel II and Bankers’ Incentives to Take Excessive Risks”, if adopted they