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an evaluation of china’s shareholding re,institution building and welfare compensation in economic transition: an evaluation of china’s shareholding reform3.7萬字28頁in this paper, we argue that instituti...
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Institution Building and Welfare Compensation in Economic Transition: An Evaluation of China’s Shareholding Reform
3.7萬字 28頁
In this paper, we argue that institution building and welfare compensation are the two main tasks in the transition from planned to market economy. We then evaluate China’s shareholding reform initiated at the 15th Party Congress. We will show that without institutional underpinnings, the shareholding reform by itself is unlikely to solve the problems China’s state sector is facing. We then argue that the key to a successful restructuring of the state sector lies in the development of the country’s market-oriented institutions, in particular, financial markets, a social welfare system, and legal institutions.
1. Introduction
The 15th Party Congress has endorsed the shareholding system as the new model for the state sector. The plan is to convert state enterprises into shareholding corporations. The main objective of the proposed shareholding scheme is to separate the government from enterprises. It is hoped that with the separation, the reform will help (1) to define property rights and clarify rights and responsibilities, (2) to restructure the state assets and introduce asset management, (3) to improve workers’ incentives, and (4) to improve the structure of finance.
It is not yet clear whether the government has a detailed blueprint. Some of the measures that have been taken or been proposed include forming giant corporations through mergers and acquisitions, forming stock cooperatives through employee buyouts, and selling off some of the state assets to non-state enterprises including foreign investors. For most large- and medium-sized state enterprises, the state would still hold either a majority or a significant minority stake. Even in the case of stock cooperatives, the state assets would likely be significant.
3.7萬字 28頁
In this paper, we argue that institution building and welfare compensation are the two main tasks in the transition from planned to market economy. We then evaluate China’s shareholding reform initiated at the 15th Party Congress. We will show that without institutional underpinnings, the shareholding reform by itself is unlikely to solve the problems China’s state sector is facing. We then argue that the key to a successful restructuring of the state sector lies in the development of the country’s market-oriented institutions, in particular, financial markets, a social welfare system, and legal institutions.
1. Introduction
The 15th Party Congress has endorsed the shareholding system as the new model for the state sector. The plan is to convert state enterprises into shareholding corporations. The main objective of the proposed shareholding scheme is to separate the government from enterprises. It is hoped that with the separation, the reform will help (1) to define property rights and clarify rights and responsibilities, (2) to restructure the state assets and introduce asset management, (3) to improve workers’ incentives, and (4) to improve the structure of finance.
It is not yet clear whether the government has a detailed blueprint. Some of the measures that have been taken or been proposed include forming giant corporations through mergers and acquisitions, forming stock cooperatives through employee buyouts, and selling off some of the state assets to non-state enterprises including foreign investors. For most large- and medium-sized state enterprises, the state would still hold either a majority or a significant minority stake. Even in the case of stock cooperatives, the state assets would likely be significant.
