“搭便車”與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中股東行為的分析
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內(nèi)容提要：本文討論的是公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中小股東搭便車的問題，并進(jìn)一步對(duì)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中股東行為進(jìn)行了分析。作者提出，一方面由于集體行動(dòng)和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，小股東搭監(jiān)督的便車；另一方面，小股東并沒有因?yàn)椤按畋丬嚒鲍@得額外的利益，反而往往自己利益受到侵害，股東代表大會(huì)將流于形式。由于資本鎖定和未來的信息收益，大股趨向于提供監(jiān)督，并有可能通過侵害小股東的利益獲得監(jiān)督租金。在資本市場給定的狀況下，監(jiān)督租金的大小由法律制度決定。作者認(rèn)為為了維護(hù)資本市場和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的的有效性，如何保護(hù)股東間的實(shí)質(zhì)性平等以及保護(hù)小股東的合法權(quán)益是重要的。
關(guān)鍵詞： 股東行為 監(jiān)督 搭便車 博弈









Free-rider problem and the behaviors of shareholders
in corporate governance

Abstract
This article analyzes the free-rider problem in corporate control, and develops a game-theoretic model to further analyze the behaviors of shareholders. We show the small shareholders take free-riding on monitor by reason of the collective action and the share of stock, unlike other free-rider, they haven’t been beneficial from free-riding, but got loss. Furthermore, free-rider problem make the meeting of stockholders exist in name only. The large shareholders have incentive to provide corporate monitoring for the capital lock-in and the benefit of information trading in future market, and have opportunity to extract monitoring rent by seizing interest of small shareholders. Given the condition of capital market, the monitoring rent is determined by legal system. We conclude in order to hold the effective of capital market and corporate governance, it is important to protect the rights and interests of small shareholders for institution designer.