[外文翻譯]全球經(jīng)濟危機的教訓.rar
[外文翻譯]全球經(jīng)濟危機的教訓,/we need a better cushion against risk內(nèi)包含中文翻譯和英文原文，內(nèi)容完善，建議下載閱覽。①中文頁數(shù) 2中文字數(shù) 2163②英文頁數(shù) 4英文字數(shù) 7602③ 摘要 上世紀50年代從芝加哥大學(university of chicago)的哈里馬科維茨(h...
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原文檔由會員 鄭軍 發(fā)布
[外文翻譯]全球經(jīng)濟危機的教訓/WE NEED A BETTER CUSHION AGAINST RISK
內(nèi)包含中文翻譯和英文原文，內(nèi)容完善，建議下載閱覽。
①中文頁數(shù) 2
中文字數(shù) 2163
②英文頁數(shù) 4
英文字數(shù) 7602
③ 摘要
上世紀50年代從芝加哥大學(University of Chicago)的哈里•馬科維茨(Harry Markowitz)著作中發(fā)展起來的非常風險管理理論產(chǎn)生了真知灼見，后來多次贏得了諾貝爾經(jīng)濟學獎。這個理論不僅為學術界所接受，也為絕大多數(shù)金融專業(yè)人士及全球監(jiān)管部門廣泛接納。
但2007年8月，風險管理框架出現(xiàn)了裂痕。所有先進的數(shù)學和計算機法術本質上都依賴于一個核心前提：金融機構所有人和管理人開明的利己做法將積極監(jiān)視公司資產(chǎn)和風險倉位，從而導致他們保持足夠緩沖以應對破產(chǎn)。數(shù)代人以來，這似乎是顛撲不破的前提，卻在2007年夏季破滅了。市場運作者在十分樂觀時，將風險管理技術和風險產(chǎn)品設計做得十分復雜，即便是最成熟的市場參與者，也過繁復以至于無法審慎處理。
The extraordinary risk-management discipline that developed out of the writings of the University of Chicago's Harry Markowitz in the 1950s produced insights that won several Nobel prizes in economics. It was widely embraced not only by academia but also by a large majority of financial professionals and global regulators.
But in August 2007, the risk-management structure cracked. All the sophisticated mathematics and computer wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that the enlightened self- interest of owners and managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring their firms' capital and risk positions. For generations, that premise appeared incontestable but, in the summer of 2007, it failed. It is clear that the levels of complexity to which market practitioners, at the height of their euphoria, carried risk-management techniques and risk-product design were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle prudently.
④關鍵字 經(jīng)濟危機/ financial pr
內(nèi)包含中文翻譯和英文原文，內(nèi)容完善，建議下載閱覽。
①中文頁數(shù) 2
中文字數(shù) 2163
②英文頁數(shù) 4
英文字數(shù) 7602
③ 摘要
上世紀50年代從芝加哥大學(University of Chicago)的哈里•馬科維茨(Harry Markowitz)著作中發(fā)展起來的非常風險管理理論產(chǎn)生了真知灼見，后來多次贏得了諾貝爾經(jīng)濟學獎。這個理論不僅為學術界所接受，也為絕大多數(shù)金融專業(yè)人士及全球監(jiān)管部門廣泛接納。
但2007年8月，風險管理框架出現(xiàn)了裂痕。所有先進的數(shù)學和計算機法術本質上都依賴于一個核心前提：金融機構所有人和管理人開明的利己做法將積極監(jiān)視公司資產(chǎn)和風險倉位，從而導致他們保持足夠緩沖以應對破產(chǎn)。數(shù)代人以來，這似乎是顛撲不破的前提，卻在2007年夏季破滅了。市場運作者在十分樂觀時，將風險管理技術和風險產(chǎn)品設計做得十分復雜，即便是最成熟的市場參與者，也過繁復以至于無法審慎處理。
The extraordinary risk-management discipline that developed out of the writings of the University of Chicago's Harry Markowitz in the 1950s produced insights that won several Nobel prizes in economics. It was widely embraced not only by academia but also by a large majority of financial professionals and global regulators.
But in August 2007, the risk-management structure cracked. All the sophisticated mathematics and computer wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that the enlightened self- interest of owners and managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring their firms' capital and risk positions. For generations, that premise appeared incontestable but, in the summer of 2007, it failed. It is clear that the levels of complexity to which market practitioners, at the height of their euphoria, carried risk-management techniques and risk-product design were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle prudently.
④關鍵字 經(jīng)濟危機/ financial pr
