企業(yè)成本控制外文翻譯
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企業(yè)的特點(diǎn)與內(nèi)部控制重大弱點(diǎn)

對(duì)薩班斯法案第404評(píng)估
Stephen Bryan
威克森林大學(xué) 巴布科克管理學(xué)院
Steven Lilien
紐約州立大學(xué)巴魯學(xué)院

  摘要
著名的薩班斯法案（SOX）要求公司評(píng)估其內(nèi)部控制的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告并且報(bào)告存在的重大錯(cuò)誤，這些重大錯(cuò)誤石油公公會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)規(guī)定的?；谠缙诘淖C據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，那些有重大錯(cuò)誤的企業(yè)，和他們相對(duì)應(yīng)的產(chǎn)業(yè)同行相比，他們的決策者團(tuán)隊(duì)更小更糟。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，那些有重大錯(cuò)誤的企業(yè)，平均上，具有較高的投資和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)系數(shù)，也就是這些公司擁有市場(chǎng)提供給他們的更高的折扣。從宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度看，那些報(bào)告有重大錯(cuò)誤的公司的市場(chǎng)總價(jià)值只有S＆P500強(qiáng)企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的1.28％。最后，雖然我們將不良股票歸納在重大錯(cuò)誤的報(bào)告中，通過(guò)一個(gè)很小的間隔，這些是無(wú)不足道的。

  建立小企業(yè)，在對(duì)于所有企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)建立企業(yè)都是非常高成本的環(huán)境下，貌似是非常不公平的。薩班斯法案是否會(huì)帶來(lái)企業(yè)效益，通過(guò)更好地運(yùn)作，降低資金成本，或其他方式還有待觀察。 此外，如果這些利益實(shí)現(xiàn)，是否應(yīng)該，實(shí)際上是立法的，是一個(gè)有爭(zhēng)議的問(wèn)題的。 雖然有些人堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為薩班斯法案會(huì)減少盈余管理，公司繼續(xù)通過(guò)盈余管理盈余預(yù)估。  此外，雖然美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)的注冊(cè)G號(hào)，也立法頒布薩班斯法案的一部分，使系統(tǒng)“通過(guò)試算收入的”有管理的披露更為透明，它不能行使收益控制權(quán)的和解進(jìn)程，企業(yè)使用這兩種設(shè)置，滿(mǎn)足分析師估計(jì)。

Characteristics of Firms with Material Weaknesses in Internal Control: An Assessment of Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley

Stephen Bryan
Babcock Graduate School of Management
Wake Forest University
Steven Lilien
Baruch College
City University of New York

Abstract The legislation known as Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) requires firms to assess their internal controls over financial reporting and to report material weaknesses, as defined by the Public Accounting Oversight Board. Based upon early evidence, we find that firms with material weaknesses are, on average, both smaller and worse performers than their matched industry counterparts.  We also find that firms with material weaknesses, on average, have higher betas, suggesting a higher discount by the market for these firms.  From a macro-economic view, the total market value of firms with reported material weaknesses is only 1.28% of the market value of the S&P 500 firms.  Finally, although we document negative stock returns on the date of the announcement of the material weakness, over a narrow interval, the returns are insignificant.
Identifying small firms that collectively constitute a minor portion of the economy at a very high cost to all public firms seems out of balance.   Whether SOX will yield benefits to corporations through better operations, reduced cost of capital, or other means remains to be seen. Moreover, if these benefits materialize, whether they should, in effect, be legislated is a matter of debate.  Although some maintain that SOX will reduce earnings management, firms continue to manage earnings through pro forma earnings.  Furthermore, although the SEC’s Reg G, also enacted as part of SOX legislation, makes the “managed disclosure system” through pro forma earnings more transparent, it fails to exercise control over the reconciliation process that firms use both to set and to meet analyst earnings estimate.