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小議公務(wù)員挑選,8000字 10頁摘要一、引言二、工資制度、懲腐力度與公務(wù)員的挑選三、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn)四、結(jié)論參考文獻(xiàn)摘要文章從委托-代理的框架上分析了公務(wù)員的腐敗問題，認(rèn)為公務(wù)員的挑選實(shí)際上是一個(gè)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問題。由于應(yīng)聘者的期望效用函數(shù)滿足spence-mirrlees條件，因此政府可以通過設(shè)計(jì)合適的工資制度和對腐敗的懲治力...
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小議公務(wù)員挑選
8000字 10頁
摘要
一、引言
二、工資制度、懲腐力度與公務(wù)員的挑選
三、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn)
四、結(jié)論
參考文獻(xiàn)
摘要
文章從委托-代理的框架上分析了公務(wù)員的腐敗問題，認(rèn)為公務(wù)員的挑選實(shí)際上是一個(gè)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問題。由于應(yīng)聘者的期望效用函數(shù)滿足Spence-Mirrlees條件，因此政府可以通過設(shè)計(jì)合適的工資制度和對腐敗的懲治力度，把高腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者和低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者分開，從而使得具有低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者成為公務(wù)員。
關(guān)鍵詞：腐敗、委托—代理、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)、Spence-Mirrlees條件
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
參考文獻(xiàn)
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
8000字 10頁
摘要
一、引言
二、工資制度、懲腐力度與公務(wù)員的挑選
三、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn)
四、結(jié)論
參考文獻(xiàn)
摘要
文章從委托-代理的框架上分析了公務(wù)員的腐敗問題，認(rèn)為公務(wù)員的挑選實(shí)際上是一個(gè)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問題。由于應(yīng)聘者的期望效用函數(shù)滿足Spence-Mirrlees條件，因此政府可以通過設(shè)計(jì)合適的工資制度和對腐敗的懲治力度，把高腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者和低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者分開，從而使得具有低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者成為公務(wù)員。
關(guān)鍵詞：腐敗、委托—代理、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)、Spence-Mirrlees條件
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
參考文獻(xiàn)
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
