湖泊流域環(huán)境治理中的府際競合及其演化研究

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目錄
第一章 緒論 7
1.1 研究背景 7
1.1.1 背景介紹 7
1.1.2 研究的目的和意義 8
1.2 國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀 9
1.2.1 國外研究現(xiàn)狀 9
1.2.2 國內(nèi)研究現(xiàn)狀 10
1.3 本文主要研究的內(nèi)容 11
第二章 相關(guān)概念及理論綜述 12
2.1 流域、行政區(qū) 12
2.2 府際關(guān)系 12
2.3 區(qū)域治理理論 12
2.4 跨區(qū)域生態(tài)補(bǔ)償理論 13
2.5 計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn)相關(guān)理論 13
第三章 府際競合建模 15
3.1 基本假設(shè) 15
3.2 系統(tǒng)內(nèi)各主體描述 15
3.2.1 中央政府主體描述 15
3.2.2 地方政府主體描述 15
3.2.3 湖泊流域居民主體 16
3.3 系統(tǒng)主體規(guī)則、行為的建立 16
3.3 模擬的情景假設(shè) 18
第四章 實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果的比較與分析 20
4.1 中央政府與地方政府之間的博弈 20
4.2 地方政府與地方政府的府際競合 22
第五章 總結(jié)與建議 24
5.1 論文總結(jié) 24
5.2 政策建議 24
致謝 26
參考文獻(xiàn)： 27

摘要 近些年來我國經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)快速發(fā)展，尤其湖泊流域的城市圈建設(shè)更是突飛猛進(jìn)。企業(yè)依托當(dāng)?shù)卣胤秸吆秃戳饔虻淖匀毁Y源優(yōu)越條件為當(dāng)?shù)卣畮泶罅渴找?，同時(shí)也給湖泊流域環(huán)境造成巨大的污染。這樣就給湖泊流域系統(tǒng)中的其他地方政府帶來失去美好生活環(huán)境和依靠湖泊自然資源發(fā)展的機(jī)會(huì)，而中央政府通過監(jiān)管地方政府的行為控制湖泊流域環(huán)境和經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。為了使湖泊流域環(huán)境和經(jīng)濟(jì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展，中央政府必須制定科學(xué)合理的政策來保證湖泊流域各方利益主體的收益。本文將中央政府與地方政府確定為湖泊環(huán)境流域的利益主體，在湖泊環(huán)境治理中以利益主體之間的府際競合關(guān)系，基于計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn)的方法建立博弈模型，對(duì)模型進(jìn)行情景假設(shè)，在模型的情景中利益相關(guān)方根據(jù)自身的情況調(diào)整各自政策努力達(dá)到自身最大收益。選擇最適合湖泊流域環(huán)境治理和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的模型參數(shù)，為湖泊環(huán)境流域系統(tǒng)的可持續(xù)提供參考。

關(guān)鍵字：博弈 府際競合 計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn) 湖泊流域


Intergovernmental Environmental Governance In The Lake Basin Competing
And Its Evolution——Based On Computational Experiments
Abstract In recent years, the rapid development of China's economy and society, particularly in the construction of the lake basin City Circle is leaps and bounds. Enterprises rely on favorable conditions of natural resources policy and local governments to bring a lot of revenue lake basin for the local government , but also cause great pollution to the lake basin environment. This gives the lake basin system other local governments to bring a better life to lose the opportunity to rely on the lake environment and natural resources development, and the central government control of the lake basin environmental and economic development through regulatory behavior of local governments . In order to make environmental and economic sustainable development lake basin , the central government must develop policies to ensure that scientific and reasonable income lake basin stakeholder parties . This article will determine the central government and local governments as the main interest of the lake basin environment , competing with Intergovernmental relations between stakeholders , game model based on the method of calculating the experimental lakes environmental governance , the model scenario assumptions in the model scenario stakeholders to adjust their policies according to their own situation and strive to achieve maximum benefit . Select the environmental management and economic development model parameters most suitable lake basins provide a reference for the lake environment for sustainable river basin system.
Key words Game Intergovernmental Competing Computational experiments
Lake Basin