公務(wù)員挑選：機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn).doc
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公務(wù)員挑選：機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn),本文共10頁(yè) 5000字左右摘要文章從委托-代理的框架上分析了公務(wù)員的腐敗問(wèn)題，認(rèn)為公務(wù)員的挑選實(shí)際上是一個(gè)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題。由于應(yīng)聘者的期望效用函數(shù)滿足spence-mirrlees條件，因此政府可以通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)合適的工資制度和對(duì)腐敗的懲治力度，把高腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者和低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者分開(kāi)，從而使得具...
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公務(wù)員挑選：機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn)
本文共10頁(yè) 5000字左右
摘要
文章從委托-代理的框架上分析了公務(wù)員的腐敗問(wèn)題，認(rèn)為公務(wù)員的挑選實(shí)際上是一個(gè)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題。由于應(yīng)聘者的期望效用函數(shù)滿足Spence-Mirrlees條件，因此政府可以通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)合適的工資制度和對(duì)腐敗的懲治力度，把高腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者和低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者分開(kāi)，從而使得具有低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者成為公務(wù)員。
關(guān)鍵詞：
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
目錄
一、引言
二、工資制度、懲腐力度與公務(wù)員的挑選
四、結(jié)論
三、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn)
參考文獻(xiàn)
Andvig, Jens Christopher, “The Economics of Corruption: A survey,” Studi economici, 46 (1991).
Banfield, Edward, “Corruption as Feature of Government Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., “A Theory of Misgovernance,” Quarterly Journal of economics, 112 (1997), 1289-1332.
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
Becker, Gary S., “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217
Becker, Gary S., and Georage J. Stiger, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal studies, 3 (1974), 1-19.
Eskeland, Gunnar and Henrik Thiele, “Corruption under Moral Hazard,” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2204.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Guednerie, R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont, “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to Control of Self-Managed Firm,” Journal of Public Economics, 25 (1984), 329-369.
Klitagarrd, Robert, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988
____, “Gifts and Bribes,” in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy and Choice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Kofman, Fred, and Jacques Lawarree, “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,” Econometrica, 61 (1993), 629-656.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
Maskin, E., and John Reley, “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (1984), 171-196.
Mirrlees, J., “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1971), 175-208.
本文共10頁(yè) 5000字左右
摘要
文章從委托-代理的框架上分析了公務(wù)員的腐敗問(wèn)題，認(rèn)為公務(wù)員的挑選實(shí)際上是一個(gè)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題。由于應(yīng)聘者的期望效用函數(shù)滿足Spence-Mirrlees條件，因此政府可以通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)合適的工資制度和對(duì)腐敗的懲治力度，把高腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者和低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者分開(kāi)，從而使得具有低腐敗傾向的應(yīng)聘者成為公務(wù)員。
關(guān)鍵詞：
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
目錄
一、引言
二、工資制度、懲腐力度與公務(wù)員的挑選
四、結(jié)論
三、機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)觀點(diǎn)
參考文獻(xiàn)
Andvig, Jens Christopher, “The Economics of Corruption: A survey,” Studi economici, 46 (1991).
Banfield, Edward, “Corruption as Feature of Government Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., “A Theory of Misgovernance,” Quarterly Journal of economics, 112 (1997), 1289-1332.
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
Becker, Gary S., “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217
Becker, Gary S., and Georage J. Stiger, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal studies, 3 (1974), 1-19.
Eskeland, Gunnar and Henrik Thiele, “Corruption under Moral Hazard,” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2204.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Guednerie, R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont, “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to Control of Self-Managed Firm,” Journal of Public Economics, 25 (1984), 329-369.
Klitagarrd, Robert, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988
____, “Gifts and Bribes,” in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy and Choice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Kofman, Fred, and Jacques Lawarree, “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,” Econometrica, 61 (1993), 629-656.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
Maskin, E., and John Reley, “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (1984), 171-196.
Mirrlees, J., “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1971), 175-208.
