1.3萬(wàn)字 15頁(yè)
摘要：
社會(huì)醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)作為國(guó)家社會(huì)保障制度的一個(gè)重要組成部分，對(duì)維護(hù)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定有著舉足輕重的地位，在保障勞動(dòng)者身體健康，抵御疾病風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等方面發(fā)揮了巨大的作用。 醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是一個(gè)世界性的難題，我國(guó)在健全和完善社會(huì)醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)體制的進(jìn)程中不可避免會(huì)面臨道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn)。我國(guó)目前因道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)造成的醫(yī)療資源浪費(fèi)的現(xiàn)象十分嚴(yán)重，如何有效規(guī)避過(guò)度消費(fèi)和誘導(dǎo)消費(fèi)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)已成為目前社會(huì)醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)體制改革的首要任務(wù)之一。

Abstract: This thesis proceeds from the moral hazard circumstance of social medical insurance in China’s current medical and health system, and then make economics analyses of the expressions of moral hazard in social medical insurance. The thesis still use game theory to reveal the moving mechanism of the social medical insurance’s moral hazard. At last, it puts forward some useful suggestions to avoid the moral hazard.
Keywords: Social Medical Insurance; Moral Hazard; Economics Analyses; Game Theory; Avoiding