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大股東控制、私有收益與公司績效
摘要：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系一直是學(xué)者關(guān)注的問題，本文認(rèn)為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效的關(guān)系是經(jīng)由中間機(jī)制或因素發(fā)生作用的，因此引入大股東的私有收益變量。本文以2000年前上市的公司為樣本，對(duì)2001年至2003年的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、關(guān)聯(lián)資金往來和公司績效作了實(shí)證分析，結(jié)果表明我國上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)普遍存在大股東控制，在大股東控制下，容易出現(xiàn)大股東以資金占用等形式獲取私有收益，從而損害公司的經(jīng)營績效的現(xiàn)象。
關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)；私有收益；績效
Large Shareholder, Private Benefits and Firm Performance

Abstract: The relationship of ownership structure and firm performance is always the focus of researchers, we believe that the relationship is activated by some mechanisms or factors intermediate, so we introduce the private benefits of corporate control in this study. This study made empirical research on the ownership structure, private benefits and firm performance of Chinese listed companies. The results show that in Chinese stock market, most listed companies are controlled by large shareholders and the controlling shareholders always seized private benefits form listed companies at the cost of listed companies’ performance.
Keywords: ownership structure; private benefits; firm performance
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